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Abstract
In this theoretical paper, there will be offered a short introduction to the various discussions around the claim that the human mind operates
in terms of computational processes. A number of proponents who have discussed such a theory feature this assignment. Their ideas are
presented, discussed and interrelated to the general discipline of cognitive psychology, where much of that claim has been and is being put
under scrutiny. The main objective of this paper is to provide a concise understanding on the above thesis, which by the use of an extensive
literature could be further explored both by students of human cognition as well as researchers who would like a presentation to the topic on
the basis of some foundational elements regarding the mind's ability to operate as a computing metaphor.
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Introduction
The mind is a physical system implemented by the brain (Churchland & Grush, 1999). Cooper and Shallice (1995)
posit that, it is a function and organization of switches which multi-disciplinarily approach the various aspects of
cognition, such as perception, memory, attention, language, thinking and reasoning or motor control. They also
stress that, in mind are operating afferent and efferent representational units that relate to sensory and motor
molds of the brain.
The way that mind functions has raised the claim (Gazzaniga, Irvy, & Magnum, 1998; McLeod, Plunkett, & Rolls,
1998) that it is related to various computational processes taking place in brain. The aspect of computational
process is not a new one. Shannon (1948a,b) discussed this idea by examining it under the speculation of inform-
ation. He posits that the mind is a system of particular representations which activate elements of arrangements,
in order to make up messages able to convey information processes to the brain.
Eysenck and Keane (2003) argue that the claim about the computational processing of mind is connected to
computational modeling. Computational modeling reflects the attempt to simulating psychological theories and
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cognitive processes, in view to present the operation of mind meaningfully and understandably. They consider
that the mind in cognitive psychology is approached as analogous to a digital computer. According to Kuhn (1970),
this approach is dominant and is considered to be the theoretical orientation upon which the computational under-
standing of mind is based. After 1970, several cognitive psychologists, like Lachman, Lachman, and Butterfield
(1979), thought that the best way to approach mind and human cognition would be that of the information-paradigm
processing.
Simon and Kaplan (1989) argued that ideas such as the mind is a symbol-processing system or, as Eysenck
(1990) and Eysenck and Keane (2003) contend, it is a limited capacity processor having structural and resource
limitations, these ideas had led to the view that human mind likens the formulation of computer functioning. Simon
(1995) considers that the central understanding of human mind is the brain as a computing processor, where the
various topics of cognition are registered. In this perspective, Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, and Hinton
(1986) postulate that, as computers seem to be developed without reaching technological barriers, cognitive
theory, and in particular cognitive psychology, attempt to discuss the features of mind, by taking into account the
claim that it is processed computationally, developing and enhancing the capabilities of brain in general.
Reflections on Human Mind as a Computational Process Device
Eysenck and Keane (2003) assume that, in the past, cognitive psychologists used to apply flowcharts, in order
to justify the results in their experiments or to support their hypotheses. However, Eysenck and Keane argue
these flowcharts were proven as much as inaccurate and inconceivable as to the point of questioning what sort
of information was conveyed through them. They posit that questions such as ‘What is really going in those
boxes?’, ‘Under what process the arrows lead to other boxes?’, ‘What else is included in those arrows?’ or ‘What
is the meaning of encoding results through flowcharts?’ raised the issue of investigating and interpreting the mind
as a vast system of representations and interactions which, in order to be accurately examined, should be decom-
posed to a number of different levels of cognitive modeling aspects. Cooper and Shallice (1995) argue that there
should be suggested methods, able to supply such decomposition. Thus, there were proposed computational
techniques which could describe psychological theories of the human mind, without using natural language, but
formal specification patterns of logistics, directly executable as programs.
According to Eysenck and Keane (2003), there were suggested three computational modeling techniques, in order
to discuss the aspect of mind in a computational way:
1. Semantic networks: In regard to Eysenck and Keane (2003), these networks are characterized by contiguity
(two things are associated when occurred together), similarity (two things liken one another), and contrast
(two things operate as opposites). Semantic networks discuss in detail the aspects of association, likeness
and opposition of things as operational concepts.
2. Production systems: These systems, according to Eysenck and Keane (2003), are governed by the ‘if-then’
rules. They refer to an information working memory which at a given time can be accurately processed.
They relate to the aspects of short-term memory (stored information for a limited period of time) and
long-term memory (stored information for a considerable amount of time).
3. Connectionist networks: Ellis and Humphreys (1999) argue that these networks have a different structure
or layers where they store information, i.e. hidden units. Representations of concepts can be stored in
different parts of the neural-like network, without interfering one another. The method employed in these
networks is called backward propagation of errors. This method implies that imperfect patterns of errors
are noted, underlined and activated through propagation, in order to produce the required pattern.
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Simon (1980) considers that cognitive psychology aims to understand mind not just as an input-output regulator,
but in association with the internal causation its data are analyzed. Marr (1982) considers that cognitive psychology
is being dominated by the so-called ‘computational metaphor of mind’ which discusses the functional operations
of mind by constraining hypotheses about its causal mechanisms. However, once the functional analysis is not
explanatory, it has been constructed a theory known as ‘computational theory of mind’ which attempts to interpret
the systemic patterns of human mind. Fodor, Fodor, and Garrett (1975) state that, according to the computational
theory of mind, neural systems appear to have innate representations that refer to one property of thinking. Marr
(1982) posits that manipulation is the processing element of mind in this direction which means that attention is
paid not to the content of processing, but to the formal property of it, i.e. not to what is included in those repres-
entations, but how are they arranged towards processing.
Roediger (1980) claims that the evaluation of mind as a computational process is related to an interdisciplinary
grouping of cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology.
All these scientific fields are unified by the aspect that mind is information processing system. Eysenck and Keane
(2003) argue that these disciplines work towards presenting the mind in respect to a computational synthesis of
the insights emerging from all the above approaches. Eysenck and Keane stress that the computational organiz-
ation of mind appears also in short-memory which is argued as akin to the central processing unit (CPU), whereas
long-memory as akin to the hard drive of a modern PC.
McGhee (2001) maintains that the understanding of mind as a computer comes through the aspect of computa-
tionalism. Eysenck (1990) and Gregory (1998) emphasize that computationalism means that, in human mind,
there are manipulated cognitive structures, symbols, interactions and representations which relate to the idea of
the computational metaphor which was mentioned above and is employed by some of the most notable cognitive
psychologists. Gregory (1998) and Ellis and Humphreys (1999) claim that, in cognitive psychology, there is not
only the aspect of computationalism which is associated with the mind, but also the aspect of connectionism which
through the various neuronal networks of the brain (hardware) is mimicking cognitive informational processes
(software) in a parallel description of computing functions. Gregory argues that, in this context, computationalism
gives weight to the similarities between mind and computer programs, whereas connectionism draws attention
onmore neural network systems linked to information processing. Computationalism and connectionism, according
to Gregory (1998), work on information processing programs, whilst experimental research underlines the importance
of cause and effect, in order to understand and discuss the various operations of mind.
McGhee (2001) claims that there is an immense effort to understand that human mind and information processing
work side by side. Lachman, Lachman, and Butterfield (1979) argue that this idea comes through the theories of
human cognition, meaning that cognitive science, and in particular cognitive psychology, examines the mind and
attempts to build up computing programs which would be able to represent the mind as a working model and a
visual component of the contemporary science. Although, the former does not imply that computers can replace
the functioning of mind, or that they are able to investigate it thoroughly, McGhee (2001) argues that there is a
considerable need to apply theoretical models of computing on human internal representations, in order to check
whether these can be turned to programs.
For McGhee (2001), the speculation that the mind is like a computer is an idea which is also related to the aspect
of thinking. This speculation comes since middle 1960s (Bruner, 1957; Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956), when
the question was in association whether computers can think or not. Some scientists have argued that computers
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are not able of thinking because they cannot demonstrate imagination. According to these scientists, imagination
is an understanding and characteristic of human thought, therefore creative and productive and these aspects
computers do not have or acquire (Richardson, 1999; Turing, 1950). Eysenck (1990) underlines that the claim of
those scientists does not imply that computers cannot demonstrate imagination in relation to their hardware and
software, or a lack of thought when programs are pursued and executed, but that they demonstrate lack of human
thought, lack of creativeness and productivity concerned with cognitive features and patterns that are situated in
human mind. Eysenck (1990) also argues that computers and computational systems have evolved because of
the need of representing human mind in an environment outside the human brain. The need to execute represent-
ations of human mind in computing environment gave birth to the aspect of artificial intelligence. Eysenck (1990)
stresses that, nowadays, computers communicate with their users, ask questions, demonstrate opinions, follow
orders, suggest changes in the information processing and execute decisions given to them by their users. However,
the question beyond is, in what extent would computers be considered as original, creative, innovative and above
all helpful, when they lack the very basics of human cognition? Or, is it artificial intelligence, or just an interactive
intelligence which relates to the data one puts, so to represent already existing ideas of human cognitive processing?
Should one talk of artificial or superficial intelligence? Eysenck (1990) concludes that these are some of the
problems placed by cognitive psychologists, in view to find understandings that will be able to support the afore-
mentioned statement, according to which the mind is like a computer which could well be understood both in terms
of a "content-dependent machinery as well as a general-purpose system" (Varvatsoulias, 2010, p. 209).
Roediger (1980) argues that, as a form of computational process, the mind carries out operations and inputs
which produce outputs in relation to understanding. The aspect of understanding does not refer to operations re-
lating to computer processing, but to deduction of outputs into inputs, so these to be applied as programs relevant
to computational modeling networks. The meaning of understanding is associated with mind. According to Searle
(1980), programs which refer to applications of mind, such as understanding, are not processing in the same way
as in humans. Computers cannot understand what they are processing; in other words, programs cannot
demonstrate how understanding is taking place, or under which cognitive elements, it appears to operate in human
mind.
Insights That Could Invoke Further Discussions FromResearchers as to the Claim
That the Human Mind Resembles Computational Processes
From what has been argued before, it does not mean that the claim about the mind as a form of computational
process is rejected. On the contrary, cognitive psychologists (see, for example, Cooper & Shallice, 1995) place
it in a framework which is useful to be further examined and investigated. This framework is related to the aspect
of information which is a term that lies in the heart of cognitive science and cognitive psychology. The mind is a
set of computational processes operating in the brain. Each process delivers a specific function which refers to
multi-disciplinary patterns of associations (Marr, 1982). The mind is covered by the aspect that the brain is an in-
formation processor – a computer – which forms computational features processed by the mind (Eysenck & Keane,
2003).
To understand better the claim regarding the computational process of mind, cognitive psychologists consider
the idea that the mind is simulated through computer programs and information processing (Cooper & Shallice,
1995). That means simulations in cognitive psychology generally mimics the human mind and are designed to
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demonstrate internal consistency, because they are based on theories and models relevant to functions they are
entitled to do, without necessarily meaning that such programs describe how humans perform, or would perform
the same task (Gregory, 1998).
McGhee (2001) posits that computer simulations in cognitive psychology are generally designed to investigate
the mind in relation to understandings provided through cognition. The rapid increase in the processing power of
computers provides cognitive psychology with a valuable tool towards investigating humanmind (McGhee, 2001).
In this way, its various theories are implemented in order the human cognitive abilities to be examined thoroughly.
McGhee claims that the same applies to the investigation of mind as well: “The assumption that the mind is a form
of computational process refers to the relationship between predefined terms and the real-world referents of the
terms themselves. This means that computers work out the features related to one another, rather than the
reason they are related to the real world or the particular experience which humans acquire from it” (McGhee,
2001, p. 58). Chomsky (1957) maintains that information-processing refers rather to a syntactical understanding
of human mind and its cognitions, than to a semantic one. In other words, the understanding of night and day or
the passing of the hours during the day underlines that humanmind operates in the real-world environment, instead
of handling operationally input and data introduced to ‘machinery-like’ systems which reproduce what is being
entered to them from users (McGhee, 2001).
Eysenck and Keane (2003) argue that originality and creativity relate to human mind, whereas the aspect of
demonstrating them applies to computing systems. Experimental and real-world environments cannot be intercon-
nected to the assumption of a cause-and-effect relationship, because they investigate human mind from a different
point of view. In this way, computers and mind, although they can be interrelated to the aspect of demonstration,
they cannot share originality and creativity like the mind itself is concerned (Eysenck & Keane, 2003). The human
mind though can be considered as an information-processing system it cannot be replaced or reproduced through
an information technique which is more likely to represent a computational system. In this context the aspect of
computational process is relevant to the idea of a ‘form feature’ of mind which is more likely to grant an evaluation
of issues in discussion of thinking, reasoning, mental representations and information-processing, that under the
aforementioned perspective, anticipate the evaluation of mind as a computational process. Eysenck and Keane
(2003) illustrate that those issues of discussion evaluate the mind as a computational process, in connection,
however, to ‘meanings’ and ‘implications of information receiving and processing’, upon which the claim referring
to the computing-processing of mind can be maintained.
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